Segmentation is a core strategy in modern marketing and age-speci…c segmentation, which is based on the age of the consumers, is very common in practice. A characteristic of age-speci…c segmentation is the change of the segments composition during time, which may be studied only using dynamic advertising models. Here, we assume that a …rm wants to promote and sell a single product in an age segmented market and we model the awareness of this product using an in…nite dimensional NerloveArrow goodwill as a state variable. Assuming an in…nite time horizon, we use some dynamic programming techniques to solve the problem and to characterize both the optimal advertising e¤ort and the optimal goodwill path in the long run. An interesting feature of the optimal advertising e¤ort is an anticipation e¤ect with respect to the segments considered in the target market due to the time evolution of the segmentation.
Introduction
Segmentation is a core strategy in modern marketing which, coupled with dynamic advertising models, represents an interesting area of research where different disciplines can interact. Market segmentation is the result of partitioning 1 the whole market into distinct consumer groups, each characterized by special sets of attribute values, so that its members will exhibit the same needs and behaviors [1, p.379] . The introduction of segmentation in a dynamic advertising model allows to analyze some phenomena which cannot be studied from a static point of view. For example, segmentation may help the decision maker to compare di¤erent advertising media (see [2] ), or is useful to analyze advertising strategies distributed over several geographic regions (see [3] and [4] ).
In this paper we focus on the demographic segmentation based on consumers' age. Age segmentation is very common in practice, because data may be simply organized according to age of consumers and because some products are spontaneously age-speci…c. A characteristic of age-speci…c segmentation, which can be studied only in a dynamic framework, is the change of the segments composition during time. For example, the advertising e¤ort addressed to the "16 years segment" will be found in the "18 years segment" after 2 years. This phenomenon requires models of investment with vintage capital [5] and the idea that advertising may fall within this area has already been presented in [6] . In that paper the authors assume that a …rm sells a continuum of goods: new goods are continuously launched by the …rm onto the market and therefore these goods are di¤erentiated by their vintage. Our approach is di¤erent: as in [7] we assume that the …rm sells a single product, and the sales of this good in segment a at the time t depend on the goodwill level for this product in segment a at the time t. Even if, from a mathematical point of view, the model is similar to the one described in [6] , the economic interpretation in term of marketing variables is de…nitely di¤erent.
The aim of this paper is to study the deep connections between the agespeci…c segmentation and the equilibrium points in the long run. The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we described the model and we introduce the characteristic functions of an age-speci…c segmentation. In section 3 we solve the abstract problem using some Dynamic Programming techniques in in…nite dimension and we present an explicit solution for the linear quadratic instance of the model. Finally, in section 4 we show how to apply our results in some real situations and we present some numerical simulations which explicitly show the anticipation e¤ect for the advertising e¤ort with respect to the segments in the target market.
The Model
We assume a …rm sells a good in a segmented market and wants to organize an advertising campaign to support this good. The market is segmented using age as a demographic variable, which is assumed continuous with values in [0; !]. As a state variable we use the Nerlove-Arrow goodwill, which summarizes the past investment in advertising. In order to describe the market segmentation we introduce the state variable G (t; a), that represents the goodwill value at time t 2 [0; +1) for the consumers of age a 2 [0; !]. The goodwill evolution is described (as in [7] ) by means of the following partial di¤erential equation
where u (t; a) 0 is the control variable for the decision maker, and represents the advertising e¤ort at time t addressed to the consumer segment of age a. We assume the boundary conditions
and the initial condition
which mean, respectively, that the goodwill value for the segment of age 0 must be always zero and the initial goodwill value among di¤erent segments is given. Moreover, we assume that the pro…t ‡ow is linear in the goodwill for each age a 2 [0; !] and is described by the following function
where (a) > 0 represents pro…t rate of the segment a (except for the advertising costs). Hence, the whole pro…t ‡ow at the time t is described by the function
This assumption is quite familiar in dynamic advertising model when closed form solutions are desired (see e.g. [2] and the references therein).
The de…nition of advertising costs is complicated by the fact that the costs to reach a certain segment need be characteristic of such segment. Hence, we are assuming that the advertising costs are stationary in time, but nonstationary in age. Thus we assume a general advertising cost function such as
where c (a; u) is the cost ‡ow to reach the segment a with an advertising e¤ort u. The function c is assumed to be increasing and possibly (but not necessarily) convex in the advertising e¤ort variable u. Under this assumption the total advertising cost ‡ow is
We notice that often in literature the advertising cost function is assumed quadratic (see e.g. [8, p. 103] ) which corresponds to de…ning a simple instance of the (4) , that is
Summarizing all our assumptions, we may formulate the problem as follows. A …rm wants to organize an advertising campaign (choosing an advertising function u (t; a) 0) in order to maximize the functional
under the constraint 8 < :
If arrested at the short run, the model falls within the family of age-structured control systems and can be studied using the necessary condition introduced in [9] . In the long run instead, Dynamic Programming techniques in in…nite dimension prove to be e¢ cient in computing optimal couples and equilibrium points. Such techniques are also promising in the case, which we leave for future work, in which the pro…t ‡ow has a nonlinear dependence on the goodwill G (t; a).
In order to clarify the more general case of the next section, we brie ‡y recall the classical linear quadratic instance of this model. If market is not segmented, then we have a single goodwill G (t) and its evolution is described by an ordinary di¤erential equation
which is the motion equation introduced by Nerlove and Arrow in their seminal paper [14] . The objective functional, assuming a quadratic advertising cost function is
Using the phase-space analysis it is simple to obtain that the optimal advertising investment u opt is constant
and the equilibrium goodwill G 1 is
As we want to take an age segmentation into account we have to modify both the motion equation (6) and the objective functional (7) . In the motion equation we need to consider time evolution of segments and the possibility of reaching reach di¤erent segments with di¤erent advertising e¤orts, we leads to a partial di¤erential equation (1) . In the objective functional we need to consider that both revenues and advertising costs are segment-speci…c, hence the pro…t is described by (5) . Finally, we remark that an equilibrium point as (9) becomes, in an age-structured setting, an equilibrium function of the variable a, which describes segmentation in the long run. One of the aims of this paper is to provide existence of such equilibrium function and study its dependence on the functions (a) and c (a; u) that describe the segmentation.
Dynamic Programming in in…nite dimension
One of the aim of this paper is to show how in…nite dimensional techniques may be powerful and e¢ cient to compute optimal couples and equilibrium points. The technique consists in rephrasing the original control problem for the partial di¤erential equation (1) as a problem for a suitable ordinary di¤erential equation, but in an in…nite dimensional setting. The reader is adviced that the unconstrained problem is studied …rst, while later in subsection ?? we show how the problem with positivity constraints on the control may be obtained as an equivalent unconstrained problem with modi…ed cost functions.
First of all we consider the space of square integrable functions of variable a as the state space of the control problem, that is
where
; and hf; gi denotes the scalar product of f and
. Similarly one chooses L 2 (0; !) as the control space, and u(t) as the control, where u(t) is that function of L 2 (0; !) such that u(t)(a) = u(t; a). Hence, if f 0 denotes the distributional derivative of f; we set
and introduce the di¤erential operator A with domain
so that the original evolution system given by (1), (2), (3) becomes a control system for an ordinary di¤erential equation in the Hilbert space
The boundary condition is enclosed into the de…nition of the domain D(A) of the operator A: The control operator is the identity function on L 2 (0; !): The technique is very well known and may be found in classical books on evolution equations such as [10] or the more recent [11] . In [10] , [11] one …nds also that the operator A is the generator of a strongly continuous semigroup of operators e tA t 0
with
for all f 2 L 2 (0; !), a 2 [0; !]. Then by means of variation of constants formula the trajectory is given by the following function in L 2 (0; !)
By means of (11), the preceding formula can be explicited as
Regarding the objective functional, we assume that the marginal pro…t function is in the space L 2 (0; !), so that the running revenue R can be described using the scalar product:
while the running advertising investment cost is
c (a; u(t; a)) da so that the objective functional is
We notice that this functional is concave in the control-state variables. Moreover, it is structurally similar to (7) but the functions R(G(t)) and C(u(t)) hide data aggregated with respect to the a variable. The control problem is that of maximizing J over the set of admissible controls
Using this notation we de…ne the value function of the optimal control problem in the usual way:
Discounted demand in abstract terms
Next we list some properties of A , the adjoint operator of A, that prove useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1 If A is the adjoint of A, namely
, then e tA is the adjoint of e tA , with
Moreover for all > the operator I A is invertible with continuous inverse
For the proof of this Lemma and for all details on the semigroup and its adjoint the reader is referred to [12] .
We now set
and note that this function represents the discounted demand associated to one unit of goodwill of the segment a. Indeed the segment of age a becomes of age after a time a, hence the discounted demand of the segment a, which becomes of age after a time a, is e ( a) ( ):
In the meantime the unit of goodwill is exponentially decreased and amounts to e ( a) . Therefore the discounted demand of a unit of goodwill of the segment a for being of age after a time a is the integrand in (18)
It is easy to show that if is in L 2 (0; !), then has a derivative in the sense of distributions and that 0 is also in L 2 (0; !).
Moreover, the previous lemma yields
Optimal strategies and trajectories
We assume the following hypotheses:
Remark 2 Assumption (H2) may be explicited in a number on interesting cases. For instance, assume
Moreover, if we denote with
the Legendre transform of C, and with @C the subgradient of the convex function C , then (H3) implies (H2), as
Indeed, the function u 7 ! h ; ui C(u) has a maximum at u if and only if @C(u) 3 0 and, by the well known property of convex conjugate functions,
Then we come to the main result of this subsection, describing optimal controls and the value function of the control problem. Due to the linearity of the revenue with respect to the goodwill (see (14) ), the objective functional may be written separating the dependence on u and g. As a consequence, the optimal control and the value function may be computed explicitly.
Theorem 3 Assume that (H1) and (H2) hold, then the pro…t functional may be written as
Moreover, any optimal control u opt does not depend on t and satis…es
consequently the optimal value function can be written as,
In particular, it is an a¢ ne function of g, so that V is Fréchet-di¤ erentiable, with gradient
Proof . Even if the proof is similar to that given by Barucci and Gozzi in [12] , for the reader's convenience we sketch it under our assumptions. The objective functional can be rewritten as 
where the supremum in the last formula is attained at any u 2 A. As all time-constant controls are admissible, the inequality in (19) is an equality.
Corollary 4 Assume that (H1) and (H3) hold, then:
Proof. It is contained in Remark 2.
Remark 5 If (H3) holds and moreover C is di¤ erentiable, than @C ( ) is singleton and contains only the Fréchet-di¤ erential rC ( ); hence the optimal control is unique, it is independent of time t, and it is given by the following formula u opt (t) u opt = rC ( )
Equilibrium points
For the sake of simplicity we now assume that (H3) holds and that C : L 2 (0; !) ! R is …nite and di¤erentiable. Then the optimal feedback map is a constant map ' :
We de…ne an equilibrium point for the system as any stationary solution of the closed loop equation (20), that is, a solution G 1 in L 2 (0; !) to the equation
Theorem 6 Assume (H1) (H3) hold, and moreover that C : L 2 (0; !) ! R is …nite and di¤ erentiable. Then the unique equilibrium point for the problem (12)(15) is given by
rC ( )] (a s)ds
Moreover, such equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is any optimal trajectory G opt (t; a) satis…es
Proof of Theorem 6 Since the operator A has a continuous inverse A 1 :
e s f (a s)ds; the equation (21) may be written also as
yielding the desired formula for the unique equilibrium point. The stability of equilibrium is a classical result and depends on the dissipativity of the di¤eren-tial operator A.
Problems with constraints
We now add a constraint on the control
for almost all t > 0 and for almost all a in [0; !]: (22) and show that we may reformulate the constrained problem as an unconstrained problem with modi…ed running cost. Consider
It may be easily shown that the problem of maximizing J[g; u] given by (15) over U c = fu 2 U : (22) is satis…edg; subject to (12) is equivalent to the unconstrained problem of maximizing b J [g; u] over U subject to (12) . That is, the value function V c of the constrained problem satis…es
Indeed, although the supremum of b J is computed on the whole class U, a control violating the constraint cannot be optimal, and is not taken into account in the maximization process. 
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Theorem 3.
Remark. If c is a l.s.c. function, convex in the variable u, then [vw c(a; w)]
since the latter sup is constantly 1: Consequently
Some useful examples 3.5.1 Pure quadratic costs
In order to make the analysis presented in the previous Section more e¤ective, we assume here that the advertising costs are quadratic:
; and where B is the moltiplication operator B :
First of all we notice that (H4) implies (H2) and (H3), hence we can apply here the results obtained in Theorem 3 and derive
so that C is di¤erentiable with rC ( ) = B 1 :: Hence, there exists a unique optimal strategy u opt , not depending on t, and given by
with associated optimal trajectory is given by
The value function of the problem is then
Moreover, using the results contained in Theorem 6 we can show that there exists a unique equilibrium point for the control system, and such solution is given by
and such equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is
We notice that in (24) the positivity constraint is satis…ed, hence the solution of the constrained problem coincides with that of the unconstrained problem.
Linear quadratic with positivity constraints
We now assume the data satisfy (H1) and The associated optimal trajectory is given by Proof. According to Theorem 7 we consider the modi…ed cost
and the maximum is attained in u opt (a) described by (27). The remaining assertions are straightforward.
Applications

Pure quadratic costs
First of all we consider only pure quadratic costs so that the simpler setting makes the economic analysis clearer. If (H4) holds, then the optimal advertising e¤ort is
and we do not have to force the positive constraint because the advertising e¤ort de…ned by (30) is already positive. The optimal advertising e¤ort described in (30) is well known and it represents an application of the golden rule: "marginal revenues equal to marginal costs" (see [2] , formula (2.4)). However, it is interesting to notice how marginal revenues are computed in (30). The function is de…ned in (18) and represents the marginal revenue given by each segment. It is interesting to notice that (a) may be strictly positive even if (a) = 0. This phenomenon is not present in [2, formula 2.4] where the marginal revenue given by the segments out of the support of the function is always zero. This di¤erence is connected with the time evolution of the segmentation: it is profitable to invest in a segment a even if (a) = 0 when this segment will enter in the support of the function in the future. In this model advertising e¤orts anticipate the time evolution and invest also in the segments which will be later on the support of the function . In order to clarify this situation we present two simple examples. As the novelty in this model is represented by the function (18), we focus on this function and the associated function and we assume that (a) . 
Target market [ ; !]
Let the target market be [ ; !] with 2 (0; !), so that the …rm sells its product only to people of age grater than . For instance, a car is a product of this type, as it can be sold only to people who are aged above the minimum to posses a driver's licence. If we assume that the marginal revenues for all the segments in the target market are the same, we can write, after rescaling the objecting functional, We observe that this function can be seen as a product between the constant 1= ( + ) (which is the same constant we have found in (8)) and a function depending on a which describes the revenue associated to each segment. Moreover, we notice that even if [0; ) is not in the target market, the advertising ‡ow directed to these segments is not equal to zero. Then it is optimal to anticipate the time evolution of the segmentation. In the following simulation the parameters are chosen as follows: = 18; ! = 70; = 0:1; = 0:01; = 1; g (a) 0.
As well illustrated in these pictures, we can prove that u opt (t; a) has a maximum at a = (for all choice of the parameters). Moreover, using (26) we may compute explicitly G 1 (a) and prove that this function is increasing and convex in [0; ] ; and decreasing in [ ; !] (for any choice of the parameters).
Target market [ ; ]
In this second example we consider a di¤erent target market. To …x ideas we think of a …rm which wants to sell a sports car such as a coupé. As in the previous example, the target market for this product is bounded from below by the driver's licence age, and also from above: generally a family man prefers a width car instead of a coupé. Hence, assuming again that the marginal revenues for all the segments in the target market are the same, we can write, after rescaling the objective functional,
with ; 2 (0; !) and < . Then 
Here the anticipation e¤ect of the advertising e¤ort is less relevant (i.e. for a < the advertising e¤ort in the …rst example is always greater that the advertising e¤ort obtained here). In this example an investment in the segments [0; ) is less pro…table because when these segments overrun the threshold their demand vanishes. For the same reason the advertising e¤ort direct to the segment ( ; !] is always zero. In the following simulation the parameters are chosen as follows: = 18; = 40; ! = 70; = 0:1; = 0:01; = 1; g (a) 0.
Linear quadratic costs
If (H5) holds, then the optimal advertising e¤ort is
Now we assume that (a) = , while we de…ned the function (a) as follows
where a 1 0, a 2 !, while > 0. It is easy to understand the e¤ect of this new term if we consider these two pictures:
In the picture on the left we have the pure quadratic advertising cost function c (a; u) = 0:5u 2 , while in the picture on the right we have the linear quadratic advertising cost function c (a; u) = 0:5u 2 + 0:004(a + 5)(85 a)u. The linear term produces an extra cost which decreases the optimal advertising e¤ort. Using the parameters a 1 ; a 2 we can model this extra term so that it becomes age dependent. In the formulation (32) the linear term has a maximum for a = (a 2 a 1 ) =2 and by the de…nition of a 1 and a 2 we can model the position of this maximum. Now it is interesting to consider how this linear term modi…es the optimal advertising strategies we have found in the previous examples.
Target market [ ; !]
If (H5) holds with (a)
, (a) = (a + a 1 ) (a 2 a), and (a) = [ ;!] (a) then the optimal advertising e¤ort is u opt (t; a) = In the picture on the left the dashed line represents the optimal advertising e¤ort, while the other line represents the same function without applying the positive part function. It is interesting to note that the anticipation e¤ect in this simulation becomes less evident.
Target market [ ; ]
If (H5) holds with (a)
, ( 
Conclusion
In this paper we show how Dynamic Programming techniques in in…nite dimensions may be exploited to study optimal value of goodwill in the long run for an age-structured problem of optimal advertising. We can characterize the optimal goodwill in the long run and we explicitly …nd it as an equilibrium point of the closed loop equation of an abstract control problem.
A topic for further research consists in the optimal activation of an advertising channel. Actually, in the real world, a …rm cannot decide the advertising e¤ort to direct to each segments. A …rm can only activate an advertising channel which hits with di¤erent intensities di¤erent segments. The solution of the optimal activation problem of an advertising channel in a segmented market in presented in [2] , but there the time evolution of an age segmentation is not considered. The extension of the results obtained in this paper to the optimal activation of an advertising channel in an age segmented market seems to be a promising area for further research.
